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INTERNET OF THINGS SECURITY PROBLEMS 
 
The rapid development of “smart” devices leads to explosive growth of unprotected or partially protected home 
networks. These networks are easy prey for unauthorized access, the collection of personal information (including from 
surveillance cameras), interference in the operation of individual devices and the entire system as a whole. In addition, 
existing solutions for managing a smart house offer work in the cloud, which in turn reduces the availability of the 
system and simultaneously increases the risk of the unscrupulous use of personal information by the service provider 
(up to the sale of data to a third party). This article examines the existing access technologies, their weaknesses, and 
offers solutions to improve the overall security of the system with a local IoT gateway and virtual subnets. 
Keywords: Internet of things, data privacy, cloud, home dashboard. 
 
Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is essentially a construct where machines (cloud and data center-
based apps) and common devices (such as watches, toasters, thermostats, body monitors and cars) 
are connected to each other via the public Internet. Within the IoT, common devices are controlled 
and monitored remotely using wireless networks for the most part, while data flows between the 
cloud and traditional data centers for analysis and manipulation. 
While this may suffice as an appropriate technical definition, it is hardly appropriate in 
respect to how the consumer must understand the IoT and specifically how it will directly affect 
their personal privacy. In this regard, the worst-case scenario is one where the consumer forfeits all 
of their privacy due to ignorance or complacency, and then has every detail of their personal lives 
made available to anyone who wants to pay for this information from the app provider or one of the 
many data brokers who will dominate the secondary market for IoT data. Many of these 
perpetrators will then target these same consumers with specific adverts and offers, as well as 
performing behavioral experimentation, usually without the consumer‟s knowledge, much less 
specific consent. For further insights on these types of scenarios, see my previous privacy corner 
postings on data brokers and social experimentation. 
The potential for such ubiquity (billions to trillions of devices) of IoT seems like a foregone 
conclusion at this point. But there are multi-dimensional privacy challenges which must be 
surmounted if this truly is going to become a reality. To get ahead of these challenges the privacy 
engineering community (via National Institute of Standards and Technology) is currently involved 
in intense discussions as to how to “engineer in” the right privacy regime, which will provide users 
(consumers) with direct control over a wide range of their own personal privacy settings as well as 
creating auditing and measuring schemes to ensure compliance with both user settings as well as 
regulatory mandates. 
Privacy engineering is a very real challenge, and there are multiple paths in the IoT where a 
privacy regime must be monitored and maintained: 
 The device (data generator, data receiver and aggregation point). 
 The Internet (multi-directional data transport). 
 The cloud (data manipulation and aggregation point). 
 The machine (application services, big data repositories, analytics and more). 
Each path requires appropriate privacy protections to be engineered into it, with user control 
wherever appropriate (device, machine and others) while being maintained along its entire length 
(virtual and physical). High levels of encryption, redundancy and security will be necessitated to 
counter threats in flight as well as at the endpoints. There will also be regulatory controls and 
adherence monitoring, which must be facilitated along these same pathways. Most of these will fall 
under the auspices of FTC (US), Data Privacy Act (EU), and other regulatory bodies and statutes 
across the world. 
In parallel with the need for comprehensive privacy, security and compliance capabilities, the 
IoT is entirely predicated on new business models, which disrupt conventional solutions. An 
enabler of this disruption is the cost model component, which dictates low inherent costs in the 
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devices, and all other components of the value chain. These cost models will not be conducive to 
“out of band” controls via bolt on solutions. Engineering-in privacy as part of the device and other 
pathway structures will be the only path to success in which cost efficiencies are maintained while 
compliance is assured along the way. 
IoT extends the “Zone of Privacy Vulnerability” for consumers to the innermost reaches of their 
lives. They will be monitored (and potentially manipulated) every second of every day, no matter where 
they are (unless completely off the grid) or what they are doing (awake or asleep). No longer is there a 
buffer zone in the form of endpoints such as PC‟s, tablets or mobile phones. In the world of IoT, devices 
are attached to the consumer and embedded in everything around them, streaming data (and secrets) 
continuously to a variety of benign and potentially nefarious recipients and third parties. It is paramount 
that we take this into account as we develop a privacy strategy for IoT [1]. 
Default Passwords 
All smart devices are built based on some operating system, sometimes these operating systems are 
based on Unix, Linux or sometimes they are so simple as they can just run some very specific actions by 
the way all operating systems has different user privileges and security levels, and this can be one of 
security potential in this way that manufactures who built these devices or who developed or customized 
these operating systems can set Default passwords, but now we should know what is the risk potential 
exactly ,in this article we mention two risk side of such situation. 
Users mostly don‟t change default passwords and it can be very dangerous even in not 
targeted attack but in random attacks also the y can be victim of hackers and easily they can lost 
their privacy and security. 
And second, users don‟t know about these different passwords, because mostly manufactures 
use some of these passwords as their backdoor or just for their service centers, by the way without 
telling clients such habits are prohibited by international privacy laws like article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which was drafted and adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950 
and meanwhile covers the whole European continent except for Belarus and Kosovo, protects the 
right to respect for private life: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence”. Through the huge case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg, privacy has been defined and its protection has been established as a positive right of 
everyone. Data privacy laws are converging in the EU, helped by the National data protection 
authorities and the Data Protection Directive adopted in 1995. Article 17 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United Nations of 1966 also protects privacy: “No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
And same instance on different regions and countries, but still such hidden passwords levels 
are available for example, A backdoor has been found in devices made by a Chinese tech firm 
specializing in VoIP product. Or According to the leaked information, FortiOS operating system, 
deployed on Fortinet‟s FortiGate firewall networking equipment, includes an SSH backdoor that 
can be used to access its firewall equipment. Anyone with “Fortimanager_Access” username and a 
hashed version of the “FGTAbc11*xy+Qqz27” password string, which is hard coded into the 
firewall, can login into Fortinet's FortiGate firewall networking equipment. This issue affected all 
FortiOS versions from 4.3.0 to 4.3.16 and 5.0.0 to 5.0.7, which cover FortiOS builds from between 
November 2012 and July 2014, and of course many different other instances. 
Limited Permission Access 
Mostly companies don‟t take full permission to clients, Some manufacturers or carriers may 
try to refuse you warranty service if you find a specific privilege access level to manage their 
devices. For example, on Mobile Devices we see such issue, iPhone are Jailed, Android devices are 
not Rooted and then clients cannot access to file systems and make changes in deep of system files 
or even install some application to give information about their devices. Then without security 
analyzing we cannot approve these manufactures don‟t use clients data‟s or even they don‟t have 
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any backdoor on such devices. specially smart devices are involved to our life 24/7 and even homes 
TV or even refrigerators and are on such risks. 
Privacy for Sale 
Some companies also collect and analyze information about users‟ “tweets, posts, comments, 
likes, shares, and recommendations.” While many of these details were already available on the 
data companies‟ websites, the lawmakers used the letters as a chance to raise awareness about an 
industry that they said has largely “operated in the shadows.” 
And now with growing IoT devices such companies can work easier because they have ear & 
eye everywhere, in our homes, in industry or even in very sensitive structures, today IoT devices are 
working everywhere and collecting data for manufactured companies are easy, and because of 
reasons that we wrote before even it is hard to detection. In this phase, we can see to side of risk, 
first side is non personal data‟s, for example, the Czech Republic based security software vendor 
AVG Technologies recently updated its privacy policy. The objective of the changes, according to 
the company, was to explain in a more transparent manner to their users how it intends to use what 
it calls “non-personal information”. The new privacy policy will take effect on 15 October 
2015.The company defines “non-personal data” as data that cannot be linked to the identity of users 
in any way. The new privacy policy explains that the company might collect and sell this 
information to third parties) or many other samples. 
Over the past years or so, a huge amount of attention has been paid to government snooping, 
and the bulk collection and storage of vast amounts of raw data in the name of national security. 
What most of you don‟t know, or are just beginning to realize, is that a much greater and more 
immediate threat to your privacy is coming from thousands of companies you‟ve probably never 
heard of, in the name of commerce. They‟re called data brokers, and they are collecting, analyzing 
and packaging some of our most sensitive personal information and selling it as a commodity to 
each other, to advertisers, even the government, often without our direct knowledge. Much of this is 
the kind of harmless consumer marketing that‟s been going on for decades. And as we mentioned 
even it is possible for them to sell personal data‟s specially for spying or watching for example: 
released to the public on March 7, 2017, the first set of documents has been called “Year Zero” by 
Wikileaks. It is said to include details of the CIA‟s global hacking program, its malware, and zero-
day exploits for a number of devices. And in these devices even smart TV‟s are available and the 
exploits are about remote voice sniffing or remote capturing. 
Data Manipulation 
Today, more than 92 percent of critical business records are generated, managed and stored 
electronically, creating efficiencies and cost-savings for businesses. Unfortunately, digital 
information can be easily deleted, altered and/or manipulated. For businesses, the burden of proof is 
on the company to ensure and attest to the accuracy and credibility of their electronic business 
records. This ability to prove the integrity of critical business records becomes especially important 
in litigation where executives are often called upon to support their claims of ownership of any 
discoverable records, as well as verify their history of creation and use. Electronic records have 
been proven to have been manipulated in cases ranging from stock options fraud to loan fraud to 
intellectual property disputes. 
Some recent examples of actual cases surrounding the manipulation of electronic records 
include top executives at a successful technology company attempted to alter electronic records to 
hide a secret options-related slush fund to cover the tracks of their backdating options scheme. 
A prominent real estate developer received an electronic version of a loan agreement to print 
and sign. Rather than just signing the document, he made subtle changes to it in order to make the 
terms of the loan more favorable to himself. The changes went undetected for a year until the loan 
was refinanced or in some other possible examples for example some companies can manipulate 
clients data‟s like their power-supply counters, or any frauds [2]. 
Suggestion as Solutions 
As first solution, we are suggesting using clouds. The cloud is a very broad concept, and it 
covers just about every possible sort of online service, but when businesses refer to cloud 
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procurement, there are usually three models of cloud service under consideration, Software as a 
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The 
comparison of cloud models is shown on Fig. 1. 
Infrastructure as a Service 
IaaS provides the infrastructure such as virtual machines and other resources like virtual-
machine disk image library, block and file-based storage, firewalls, load balancers, IP addresses, 
virtual local area networks etc. Infrastructure as service or IaaS is the basic layer in cloud 
computing model. 
Common examples: DigitalOcean, Linode, Rackspace, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Cisco 
Metapod, Microsoft Azure, Google Compute Engine (GCE) are some popular examples of IaaS. 
Platform as a Service 
PaaS or platform as a service model provides you computing platforms, which typically 
includes operating system, programming language execution environment, database, web server. It 
is a layer on top of IaaS as the second thing you demand after Infrastructure is platform. 
Common examples: AWS Elastic Beanstalk, Windows Azure, Heroku, Force.com, Google 
App Engine, Apache Stratos. 
Software as a Service 
In a SaaS you are provided access to application services installed at a server. You don‟t have 
to worry about installation, maintenance or coding of that software. You can access and operate the 
software with just your browser. You don‟t have to download or install any kind of setup or OS, the 
software is just available for you to access and operate. The software maintenance or setup or help 
will be provided by SaaS provider company and you will only have to pay for your usage. 
Common examples: Google Apps, Microsoft office365, Google docs, Gmail, WHMCS billing 
software. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Comparison of cloud models 
 
In our solution data from IoT sensors to cloud should be encrypted, and using cloud as 
infrastructure to process data‟s without knowing which data they are receiving then even PaaS is 
not suitable in this case because in PaaS, operating system, middleware and runtimes are also 
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depends on cloud then again risk of backdoor are still available and too much then we are offering 
to use IaaS (Fig. 2). 
Cloud (IaaS)
Smart homes
Smart cars
Sensors
Wearable 
devices
IoT networks
 
Fig. 2. Classical scheme of IoT system 
 
Another solution is using IoT gateway and collecting data on it like shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. “Cloud” based on the home system 
 
As the abilities and needs of devices proliferate, it is often not possible to have them 
communicate directly with systems. Some sensors and controllers don‟t support energy-intensive 
protocols like Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Some devices aggregate data so that it is overwhelming and 
invaluable in its raw form and they are all connecting to a variety of public and private networks. 
An IoT gateway performs several critical functions from translating protocols to encrypting, 
processing, managing and filtering data. If you imagine an IoT ecosystem, a gateway sits between 
devices and sensors to communicate with the cloud. 
IoT gateways help to bridge the gap between operations and IT infrastructure within a 
business. They do this by optimizing system performance through the operational data they gather 
and process in real-time in the field or at the network edge. 
IoT gateways can perform a number of enhancements on the OT and IT silos: 
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 High scalability—they are able to take intelligent data from the datacenter or cloud and push into 
the field or network edge. 
 Lowering costs—end-point devices needn‟t have as high processing power, memory or storage 
since the gateway does this all for them. 
 Faster production—an accelerated and more advanced production line can decrease time-to-market 
significantly. 
 Reduce telecommunications cost—less M2M communication means a smaller network and (WAN) 
traffic. 
 Mitigate risks—gateways can isolate devices and sensors that aren‟t performing before they cause 
bigger problems for the production line. 
Adding a Layer of Security 
As the number of devices and sensors grow, so does the number of communications that will 
take place over a combination of public and private networks. Communications between the 
„things‟, the gateway and the cloud therefore must be secure in order to prevent any data tampering 
or unrestricted access. 
This will usually happen through a PKI infrastructure, whereby every “thing” that 
communicates is given an identity, that is, a pair of cryptographic keys (or Digital Certificate) 
which allows communication to be encrypted. This can be quite a handful to manage without the 
help of an IoT gateway. 
Assuming you have a tool which manages all of your device certificates, you need the gateway to help 
mediate the on-boarding of devices (installation of certificates and provisioning of identity) 
How to Secure an IoT Gateway 
There are three key core principles of security—confidentiality, integrity and authentication. 
You will need to ensure that all communications between the gateway and devices are meeting each 
of the three principles while communication is happening in the internal and external networks. 
It is also worth noting that the gateway is often the first to be attacked because of two reasons: 
It has a higher processing power, which it can use to run more intensive applications. More 
power means better software, but better software means more vulnerabilities for a hacker to exploit. 
Because of its location as an Edge device between the internet and the intranet, the gateway is 
the point of entry for any threat vector (as well as a system‟s first line of defense). 
Our recommendations on securing an IoT gateway device involve three steps. 
Step 1. Identity for the Gateway Device 
The first step would be to give your gateway device an identity (by using an X.509 Digital 
Certificate). Any external entities connecting to the gateway will now be able to verify the identity 
of the gateway which is now enabling HTTPs or NTLS protocols. Commands being issued to 
devices or sensors in the field are now coming from a trusted device. 
Step 2. Enable “Strong” Identity for the Gateway Device 
Because your gateway device is vulnerable to physical tampering, private keys can be 
extracted and cloned leaving your gateway device vulnerable to spoofing or even man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks. 
In order to prevent this, you would have to use extra security measures, such as embedding a 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) device into your Gateway, using a PUF (Physical Un-clonable 
Function). This would securely store the private keys of all Digital Certificates, making sure they 
never leave the gateway. 
Step 3. Use the Gateway to Provision Identity to Your Ecosystem 
Now that you have enabled strong identity in your gateway device, you need to think about 
having strong identity for the devices and sensors in the field. Because some of these are likely 
unable to connect to the internet, provisioning identity through a Certificate Management Service 
without a Gateway will be difficult [3]. 
Instead, we can use the gateway as a trusted security mechanism to secure anything that is 
connected to the gateway (on the intranet). The gateway acts as a proxy between the platform (CA 
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Services) and the devices in the field. As with the device itself you would expect this to happen 
using the standard PKI infrastructure, that is, an X.509 certificate through a private hierarchy. 
Now the gateway and devices are secure and therefore all the communication in your intranet 
is secure. Therefore, you have security, confidentiality and authentication, allowing your IoT 
ecosystem to be end-to-end secured using a PKI infrastructure [4]. 
Another solution can be like diagram as shown in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Virtual networks on one device 
 
In this scenario on Raspberry Pi be should install at least these services: web service (e. g., 
Apache); DNS server (Bind); DDNS client (optional); access point (HostAPd); DHCP server; 
firewall (iptables); IDS/IPS (Snort). 
Also for balancing load and make another layer for security, it can be expand and add a router 
to another scenario (Fig. 5). 
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Fig. 5. Virtual networks on different devices 
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In this scenario on RaspberryPi be should install at least these services: web service (Apache); 
access point (HostAPd); firewall (iptables); IDS/IPS (Snort). On AP we need install: DHCP and 
DNS. 
And in this scenario we don‟t need DDNS and also ESP8266 working as Access-point 
Repeater and it resend all UDP packets that received from other IoT devices who are connecting to 
that. In this way, Raspberry Pi can work as brain of this network and some IoT devices are 
connecting to Raspberry Pi directly and some others they are connecting to ESP8266, and ESP8266 
repeating the Raspberry Pi wireless network and also it send all UDP Data‟s to Raspberry Pi then 
directly or in-directly all IoT devices are connecting to Raspberry Pi and it can analyze all of these 
data‟s and show results on Dashboard. 
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